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We study the relationship between career concerns and shared values empirically using employee-employer matched
data for the United Kingdom and overtime hours as a proxy for hard work. In line with standard career-concerns theory
(Holmstro¨m 1982) we find that employees work less overtime, the longer they have been with their current employer.
We also find that employees who agree strongly with the statement, “I share many of the values of my organisation”
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design of career paths across the private, public and voluntary sectors.
JEL classification: J22, J24, L33, M12, M50
Keywords
Career concerns, pro-social motivation, voluntary sector
1 Introduction
Conventional economics implies that rational, utility-
maximising employees need to be motivated to undertake
hard work through some form of incentive. The theory
of career concerns describes how an employee’s implicit
incentive to work hard for an employer is stronger earlier
in their career because the opportunity to signal talent and
influence future wages diminishes over time (Fama 1980;
Holmstro¨m 1982).
Of course other factors can also influence employee
effort, and a growing area of research examines the effect
on effort of aligning employee and employer values or
goals. One prominent example of this is pro-social motiva-
tion in mission-motivated organisations (Besley and Ghatak
2005). It has been well established that there is a
relationship between organisational form and pro-social
behaviour, with particular consequences for employment
relations (Be´nabou and Tirole 2006; Besley and Ghatak
2005; Glaeser and Shleifer 2001; Francois and Vlassopoulos
2008).
Our interest lies in exploring how an alignment of val-
ues between employer and employee might influence the
decision of workers to exert effort at different career stages
and how this interacts with the conventional career-concerns
literature. In a recent theoretical study, Shchetinin (2012)
incorporates the idea of mission alignment into the standard
career-concerns model and demonstrates how the incentive
to signal talent is weaker for employees who share the values
of their employer.
The aim of our paper is to investigate this theoretical
trade-off between career concerns and shared values empiri-
cally using employee-employer matched data for the United
Kingdom from two waves of the Workplace Employment
Relations Survey (WERS) in 2004 and 2011. Specifically,
we ask whether (1) employees work harder at the beginning
of their employment, (2) employees who share the values
of their employer work harder than those who do not, (3)
hard work then depends less on tenure for employees with
shared values, and (4) the shared values incentive dominates
the career concerns incentive. We go on to consider whether
the relative importance of career concerns and shared values
varies across the private, public and voluntary sectors.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses
the previous career-concerns literature and makes the link
between career concerns, effort and shared values. Section
3 describes the theoretical model of Shchetinin (2012) and
derives the four hypotheses that we test in this paper. Section
4 describes the dataset that we use and the model that we
estimate. Section 5 outlines the results of our analysis, and
Section 6 draws a number of conclusions from the results.
2 Literature Review
Employers can influence employee effort through an
explicit incentive such as pay based on output (Lazear
1986; Gibbons 1987). Alternatively they can use implicit
incentives such as the threat of dismissal for under-
performance (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) or a concern for
career progression and the future promise of higher wages
within or outside the firm (Fama 1980).
Holmstro¨m (1982) demonstrates how such implicit
incentives work through the productivity signals that
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employees send their current and potential future employers.
These incentives are necessarily stronger earlier in an
employee’s career due to the market learning more about
the employee over time and an ever-shortening horizon of
future opportunities. Indeed, Gibbons and Murphy (1992)
hypothesise that employment contracts are more likely to
specify explicit work incentives later in an employee’s
career. The authors find support for this in Forbes Executive
Compensation Survey data.
An empirical challenge in the literature on motivation and
incentives is the measurement of employee effort. One of
the more observable forms of ‘hard work’ is the undertaking
of additional hours of work. Overtime hours are defined as
“actual hours of work in excess of the standard contractual
hours” (Hart 2004). Overtime hours may be a voluntary
decision on the part of individual employees, or may result
from a contractual obligation that employees work additional
hours when requested by an employer. However, for most
employees, overtime working is a voluntary activity, and not
all employees choose to work additional hours (Hart 2004).
Several studies suggest that career concerns are most
pronounced for employees undertaking unpaid overtime. For
instance Pannenberg (2005) shows that German workers
doing unpaid overtime experience 10% higher wage growth
over a ten-year period than other workers. Comparing
German and UK data, Bell et al. (2001) report a positive
relationship between undertaking unpaid overtime and
employee perceptions of their promotion prospects among
British workers, although no relationship is found for
German workers.
Booth et al. (2003) use overtime hours as a proxy for effort
in their analysis of promotions based on firm-specific human
capital.1 Anger (2008) seeks to separate the pure signalling
component of overtime from the effect of additional work
hours on the accumulation of human capital. She finds
evidence that at least some overtime work leads to higher
earnings without increasing productivity, particularly among
white-collar workers in West Germany. Employers can
exploit the signalling property of work hours for recruitment
and promotion purposes. Landers et al. (1996) demonstrated
how two large American law firms deliberately set norms
of inefficiently long working hours in order to overcome
the problem of adverse selection. Only really dedicated
employees then choose to work for them because such long
hours put off less committed candidates from applying.
Bratti and Staffolani (2007) outline a career-concerns
model where workers undertake additional hours of work
in order to influence future pay. They analyse British data
to show that longer working hours are associated with
individuals’ perception of promotion chances. Consistent
with this, and the relation between working hours and effort,
is the finding of Engellandt and Riphahn (2005) that workers
on temporary contracts engage in additional hours of unpaid
overtime in order to increase the chances of being promoted
to a permanent contract.
Akerlof (1982) describes how unpaid overtime can be
a form of partial gift-exchange between employees and
employers through an implicit contract where workplace
norms sustain higher effort in return for wages above
the market-clearing rate. A more altruistic form of gift-
giving through effort is considered by Gregg et al. (2011)
who examine additional hours of work in the pro-social-
motivation context, testing the donated-labour hypothesis
in nonprofit organisations by examining data on unpaid
overtime. Data from the British Household Panel Survey
are used in both cross-section and panel form to test the
hypothesis of sector differences in donated labour. The
authors find that workers in nonprofit organisations are more
likely to donate their labour than those in for-profit firms.
They show that this is not due to implicit contracts. The
results also suggest that individuals may select into sectors
based on their propensity to donate labour.
The growing literature on pro-social motivation explores
alternative motivating factors that include non-financial
sources of employee utility. One of the key predictions of this
literature is that the utility gained from working for a pro-
social organisation with which mission-motivated workers
share values will form part of the compensation for workers,
leading to lower wages paid in nonprofit organisations
compared to for-profit companies for equivalent effort
(Rose-Ackerman 1997; Besley and Ghatak 2005). The
mission-motivated agents in Besley and Ghatak (2005) exert
higher levels of effort because they derive ‘warm glow’
utility from the output. A further theoretical consequence of
Besley and Ghatak (2005) is that the different level of effort
amongst employees depends on the quality of the match of
values between employer and employee. Workers who more
closely share the values of their employer have a greater
incentive to exert effort without incentive pay.
Empirical work on matching has focused on this
match between pro-social motivation and employers.
The experiments of Fehrler and Kosfeld (2014) find no
significant impact on effort of allowing subjects to choose
the mission of their ‘employer’. However about a third of
subjects are willing to accept lower wages in order to choose
a pro-social employer, and these subjects exert significantly
higher effort. Gerhards (2015) shows increased effort for
mission-matching amongst both students and NGO workers,
with more selfish behaviour emerging when the experiment
includes repeated interactions. Carpenter and Gong (2016)
also show that mission-matching is a strong motivator, and
that performance pay has a stronger incentive effect when
missions are mismatched. These experiments suggest that
while pro-social motivation can influence effort, selection
into a pro-social sector is also important. Dur and Zoutenbier
(2015) show that altruistic workers sort into mission-
motivated employers early in their career using German
Socio-Economic Panel data. They also find greater levels
of self-reported ‘laziness’ amongst public sector employees,
particularly later in their careers. Dur and Zoutenbier (2015)
do not find a clear pattern between altruism (measured by
self-report) and job tenure, in contrast with other evidence
that altruistic motivation (measured by charitable donations)
declines with tenure (Buurman et al. 2012).
The incentives of career concerns and shared values
provide different motivations for the allocation of effort
through job tenures. Although much of the theoretical and
empirical work on shared values has focused on pro-social
motivation, the incentive to greater effort could be felt more
broadly for employees who share the goals of their employer
whatever those goals are. Shchetinin (2012) brings these
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competing motivations together in a theoretical model, and
it is this to which we turn next.
3 Theoretical Framework
We now present the theoretical model on which our
hypotheses are based. Following Shchetinin (2012), the
utility function of employee i in period t is
Ui,t (wi,t, θi, yi,t) = wi,t + θi (yi,t − wi,t)− C (ei,t)
where wi,t is i’s fixed wage in period t and θi ∈ [0, 1] is the
(time-invariant) extent to which her values are aligned with
the objectives of her employer.2 Her work output in period t
yi,t = ai + ei,t + εi,t
is the sum of three components: talent ai, effort ei,t and
random noise εi,t. C (ei,t) represents her cost of effort,
which is a convex function. Both talent and the noise
term are unobservable, drawn from normal distributions and
independent from one another[
ai
εi,t
]
∼ N
([
a
0
]
,
∑
=
[
σ2a 0
0 σ2ε
])
.
Future utility is discounted by δ > 0 per period. For
simplicity we consider the two-period setting where
equilibrium effort e∗i,t is characterised by the first-order
condition3
C′
(
e∗i,t
)
= θi + (1− θi) · (2− t) · δ
σ2a
σ2a + σ
2
ε
. (1)
Career concerns are represented by the last term on the
right-hand side of equation (1). Intuitively, since there are
two periods, the employee can work hard in the first period
to suggest high talent and increase her value to employers in
the second period. These career concerns play a greater role,
the more important the future (the higher is δ) and the more
uncertainty surrounds the employee’s talent (the greater σ2a
in relation to σ2ε ). This is the standard career-concerns result
whereby employees work hard early in their careers in order
to influence employer beliefs about their ability, and hence
future wages, the greater the range of abilities (Holmstro¨m
1982).4 We thus state our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Employees work harder earlier in their
careers.
Shared values affect employee effort in both a positive and
a negative way. On the one hand employees who share their
employers’ values (those with high θi) expend more effort
because they derive utility from the net benefit of their effort
to the employer (output less wages). This forms the basis for
our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Employees who share the values of their
employers work harder than those who do not.
On the other hand the implicit incentive to work hard
in order to influence employer beliefs and increase future
wages is weaker for employees who share their employers’
values. This is because an employee who cares5 about net
benefit to the employer also recognises that an increase in
wages will reduce that net benefit. Career concerns are thus
less important for an employee who shares the values of her
employer. We base our third hypothesis on this theoretical
result.
Hypothesis 3. Hard work depends less on tenure with
the employer for employees who share the values of their
employers.
The overall effect of shared values on effort depends
how strong career concerns are in the first place. Shchetinin
(2012) describes the possibility of observing ‘performance
reversal’ for workers sharing values, where the reduction in
effort from removing the career concerns incentive is greater
than the gain in effort from sharing values. If the future is
not important or there is not much uncertainty surrounding
employee talent and thus less potential to influence future
wages then shared values will have a positive overall effect
on effort. However if the implicit incentive to work hard
in order to increase future wages is strong enough then
the direct positive effect of shared values on effort will be
outweighed by their indirect diminishing effect on career
concerns. Which effect dominates is ultimately an empirical
question, and forms the basis of our fourth hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4. The effect of shared values outweighs the
effect of career concerns.
We now go on to describe the data and methods that we
use to test these four hypotheses.
4 Data and Empirical Methods
We use data from two waves of the UK Workplace
Employment Relations Survey (WERS), pooled for the
years 2004 and 2011. WERS is an employer-employee
linked nationally representative survey of organisations
covering the state of employment relations and working
life inside British workplaces. Employers are drawn as a
stratified random sample, and data are collected on finances,
staffing and employment policies and practices within the
organisation. A random sample of up to 25 employees
from each workplace is then drawn, who each complete
an individual worker questionnaire. The data we use in
this paper are drawn primarily from the individual worker
questionnaire, with organisation characteristics from the
management questionnaire.
We explore the extent to which employees share their
employer’s values without determining what those values
are. The values of an organisation are a fairly abstract
concept and are challenging to measure (Meglino and Ravlin
1998). We focus on the employee’s own perception of the
match with their employer’s values. O’Reilly and Chatman
(1986) found that self-reported measures of organisational
values were correlated with pro-social behaviour within
organisations, but they acknowledge the difficulties of
demonstrating a causal link. Combining data from both the
WERS employee and management questionnaires, at the
organisation level we do find a strong positive association
between employees’ reports of sharing values and managers’
perceptions of value sharing (Kendall’s tau-b coefficient of
0.16; p <0.001). However, as we do not observe employees
longitudinally we are not able to model how the sharing
of values might evolve over time. In particular we cannot
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rule out that shared values are developed as a result of the
high levels of effort expended during an employee’s tenure,
although we do not find a strong association between length
of tenure and levels of shared values.
We use two survey questions about perceived work
intensity to explore overtime working as a proxy for effort,
without directly observing a measure of effort. Employees
are asked how strongly they agree with the statement that
“my job requires that I work very hard”. Individuals who
agree strongly with this statement work on average 50%
more overtime hours than those who do not. The 2011
wave of WERS also includes a question to employees about
whether “people in this workplace who want to progress
have to put in long hours” that nicely captures the employee
perception of the relationship between working hours and
career progression using a Likert scale of agreement. We
model this variable for the 2011 subsample using an ordered
logistic regression to describe employees’ perceptions of
career concerns controlling for having to work hard, working
hours and workplace tenure.6 Employees who are earlier
in their careers with their current employer are more likely
to agree that long hours are required to progress in their
organisation than those with longer tenures. Weekly hours
and reporting that their job requires working hard are
positively associated with employees being more likely to
agree that long hours are required. Although we cannot
measure employee effort directly, this descriptive analysis
supports the relationship between working hours, hard work
and employees’ concerns for future advancement.
We thus operationalise hard work as integer hours of
overtime measured through the employee questionnaire.
Differences in working patterns mean that both the levels and
prevalence of overtime working vary between occupations.
In order to account for this, individuals’ hours are evaluated
relative to the mean overtime hours worked in the occupation
(UK Standard Occupational Classifications 2000) during
that year (2004 or 2011). Average overtime hours are
evaluated at the unit group level where there are 353 possible
occupational classifications, of which 339 are represented in
our WERS sample. In order to avoid skewed estimates for
occupational groups with small sample sizes, the average
overtime is estimated with a multilevel random effects model
of overtime hours oijklm for individual i with four levels for
the major (j), sub-major (k), minor (l) and unit (m) group
occupations respectively,
oijklm = β0 + majorj + submajorjk +
minorjkl + unitjklm + ui
where
i ∈ {1, ..., n} , j ∈ {1, ..., 9} , k ∈ {1, ..., 25} ,
l ∈ {1, ..., 81} , m ∈ {1, ..., 339} .
The estimate of unit group occupation average overtime is
therefore
ôjklm = β̂0 + m̂ajorj + ̂submajorjk +
m̂inorjkl + ûnitjklm.
This has the desirable property that estimates from small
groups are ‘shrunken’ towards the mean of the higher level
groups reducing their sensitivity to outliers in small samples
(Snijders and Bosker 2011; McGovern et al. 2007).
‘Strongly shared values’ is a binary measure of whether
employees agree strongly with the statement, “I share many
of the values of my organisation.” ‘Tenure’ is a measure of
the number of years employed at the same workplace, coded
as a metric variable by taking the midpoint of each category.7
The interaction of tenure and shared values is generated as
the product of the two variables. We then implement a Tobit
model, to account for the left-censoring of overtime hours,
of the form
h∗i = β0 + β1 τi + β2 vi + β3 vi · τi + Xi
′
Γ + ui
where the latent variable h∗i is the natural logarithm of
employee overtime hours
mean overtime hours for occupation and year
,
τ denotes tenure, v stands for strongly shared values, X
is a vector of other variables influencing overtime hours
(wages, part-time working, employment sector, trade-union
membership, gender, age and family status) and u is an
error term. We expect to find βˆ1 < 0 (Hypothesis 1: direct
career-concerns effect), βˆ2 > 0 (Hypothesis 2: direct effect
of shared values), βˆ3 > 0 (Hypothesis 3: mitigating effect
of shared values on career concerns), and βˆ1 + βˆ3 = 0
(Hypothesis 4: no ‘performance reversal’ effect).
5 Results and Discussion
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the main variables are subdivided
by employment sector8 and presented in Table 1. Roughly
half of the employees sampled engage in overtime working.
This proportion is slightly lower for public-sector employees.
On average, those undertaking overtime do between 3 and
4 hours per week, while slightly more overtime is reported
in the private sector than in the other sectors. However
as a proportion of weekly contractual hours there is little
difference: part-time work, defined as contractual hours
of between 0 and 30 per week, is most common in the
voluntary sector where over one third of employees fall
into this category, compared with one fifth of private-sector
employees.9
There are differences in the demographic characteristics
of employees across the sectors. The voluntary and
public sectors are predominantly female (70% and 65%,
respectively) whereas just over half of employees in the
private sector are male. Employees in the private sector tend
to be younger and are less likely to be married or cohabiting
with a partner. A higher proportion of employees in the
voluntary sector are aged 60 and over (9% compared with
5 to 6% in the other sectors) and thus fewer voluntary-sector
workers care for children aged 18 or under.
The proportion of employees supervising others as a
part of their day-to-day duties is broadly similar across all
sectors, at just over one third. Unsurprisingly, trade-union
membership is significantly higher in the public sector (63%)
than in the private and voluntary sectors (23% and 28%
respectively). Employees in the public sector also tend to
have worked the longest for their current employers.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Sector
Variable private public voluntary
overtime hours > 0 0.499 0.475∗ 0.497
(0.500) (0.499) (0.500)
overtime hours 3.644 3.365∗ 3.347∗
(5.878) (5.959) (5.387)
tenure (years) 5.784 6.697∗ 5.707
(4.277) (4.307) (4.189)
strongly shared 0.123 0.146∗ 0.229∗
values (0.328) (0.353) (0.420)
observations 21, 937 13, 148 2, 675
Source: UK Workplace Employment Relations Survey
2004, 2011
Notes: (1) Sample standard deviations in parentheses.
(2) ∗significantly different from the private sector
(two-sample t-tests; p < 0.05).
Strikingly, as shown in Table 1, nearly double the
proportion of employees in the voluntary sector (23%) agrees
strongly with the statement, “I share many of the values
of my organisation,” compared with private-sector workers
(12%). The proportion sharing values in the public sector lies
in between but closer to the private sector at 15%. Average
wage levels are also similar for employees in the private and
public sectors but are somewhat higher than levels in the
voluntary sector.10 Taken together, these figures suggest a
selection of mission-motivated employees into the voluntary
sector, reflecting the well-established relationship between
organisational form and pro-social behaviour mentioned
in Section 1. Having considered the WERS data at the
descriptive level we turn next to our empirical model to test
our hypotheses.
5.2 Regression Analysis
Our main results are presented in Table 2. In the first column
(model 1) we only control for wage levels, part-time working
and year beyond the main variables of interest (tenure and
strongly shared values). In the second column (model
2) we then introduce sector controls and account for trade-
union membership, foremanship (supervisor) as well as
demographic characteristics. In columns 3 and 4 we separate
the empirical analysis by gender and in column 5 we restrict
it to the voluntary sector.
We find support for our first three hypotheses in model
1. In line with standard career-concerns theory (Holmstro¨m
1982) we find that employees work less overtime, the longer
they have been with their current employer (Hypothesis 1:
β1 < 0). We also find that employees who agree strongly
with the statement, “I share many of the values of my
organisation” do roughly 20% more overtime than the rest
(Hypothesis 2: β2 > 0). Moreover our positive estimate
for the coefficient on the interaction of strongly shared
values and tenure indicates that for these mission-aligned
employees the career-concerns effect is reduced by more
than half (Hypothesis 3: β3 > 0). This evidence is consistent
with the model by Shchetinin (2012) which introduces
shared values into a standard career-concerns framework.
The results are robust to controls for other factors
that are known to influence the decision to undertake
overtime, including gender, age, family status and trade-
union membership (model 2). When separating the analysis
by gender (models 3 and 4) the standard career concerns
result holds (Hypothesis 1) but it can be seen that the shared-
values results (Hypotheses 2 and 3) are stronger among
the female subsample (model 3) while the evidence is not
statistically significant for the (smaller) male subsample
(model 4). Nevertheless the signs on the coefficients are
the same in both columns and the relative magnitudes of
the coefficients on tenure and the interaction of tenure with
strongly-shared-values are similar.11 While the results for the
voluntary subsector (model 5) are statistically insignificant
the magnitude and direction of the coefficient estimates are
comparable with those in column 2 so the insignificance is
likely due to the smaller sample. A further specification using
binary controls for tenure categories instead of our metric
tenure variable, including the corresponding interactions
with strongly shared values, indicates that shared values
compensate for the lack of implicit incentives among longer-
term employees (those with tenure of ten years and over),
providing further support for Hypothesis 3.12
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Figure 1. Effect of shared values on career concerns
Our fourth hypothesis concerns whether the direct positive
effect of shared values on effort could be outweighed by
the indirect diminishing effect of shared values on the
implicit career-concerns incentive to work hard. In order
to check whether this is the case empirically we conduct
post-estimation linear-combination tests. These tests reveal
that the hypothesis β1 + β3 = 0 cannot be rejected at the
5% level for any of our specifications. This means that
for employees with strongly shared values there is no
statistically significant difference between overtime hours at
different levels of tenure. However employees with shared
values do undertake significantly more overtime than those
without, ceteris paribus (Hypothesis 2). The effect of shared
values on career concerns is shown in Figure 1 where the
partial effect of shared values on our measure of overtime
is plotted against tenure. It can be seen that, all else equal,
employees with strongly shared values work more overtime
hours than others in their occupation, across different lengths
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Table 2. Tobit regressions
1 2 3 4 5
tenure −0.048∗∗ −0.045∗∗ −0.052∗∗ −0.036∗∗ −0.044∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.023)
strongly shared 0.235∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.276∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.336∗∗
values (0.094) (0.095) (0.137) (0.132) (0.267)
strongly shared 0.037∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.025∗∗
values · tenure (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.038)
wage level 0.393∗∗ 0.348∗∗ 0.358∗∗ 0.326∗∗ 0.304∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.037)
part-time 0.188∗∗ 0.313∗∗ 0.256∗∗ 0.598∗∗ 0.274∗∗
(≤ 30 hours/week) (0.073) (0.077) (0.094) (0.135) (0.248)
year = 2011 −0.112∗∗ −0.047∗∗ −0.038∗∗ −0.059∗∗ −0.163∗∗
(0.057) (0.058) (0.074) (0.077) (0.202)
Additional controls no yes yes yes yes
Constant −6.145∗∗ −6.046∗∗ −6.392∗∗ −5.445∗∗ −5.466∗∗
(0.111) (0.130) (0.172) (0.190) (0.453)
Pseudo R2 0.029 0.033 0.034 0.026 0.033
Observations 39, 619 37, 760 20, 644 17, 116 2, 675
Left-censored obs. 20, 288 19, 248 11, 547 7, 701 1, 345
Employer clusters 3, 627 3, 618 3, 318 3, 098 251
Notes:
(1) Dependent variable: ln
(
employee overtime hours
mean overtime hours for occupation and year
)
.
(2) Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering by employer.
(3) Separate estimations by gender in models 3 (female) and 4 (male).
(4) Separate estimation for the voluntary sector in model 5.
(5) Additional controls: sector (models 2− 4), trade-union membership, foremanship,
gender (models 2 & 5), age group, marital status, dependent children.
Reference group in model 2: working in private sector, female, aged 40− 49,
married/cohabiting, no dependent children.
Reference group in models 3 and 4: working in private sector, aged 40− 49,
married/cohabiting, no dependent children.
Reference group in model 5: female, aged 40− 49, married/cohabiting,
no dependent children.
(6) ∗∗ (∗) denotes statistically significant difference from zero at the 1% (5%) level.
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of tenure. In other words, the diminishing effect of shared
values on the implicit career-concerns incentive to work hard
does not outweigh their direct positive effect on effort so
we do not witness performance reversal within our sample.
However the relationship between overtime and tenure is
only weak for mission-motivated employees, while those
without strongly shared values work fewer hours of overtime
as their tenure increases (Hypothesis 1).
5.3 Discussion
Shchetinin (2012) also considers a potential information
asymmetry surrounding shared values whereby employees
have superior knowledge of the extent to which they align
with employer objectives. Under such conditions employees
have an additional implicit incentive to signal a higher level
of shared values in order to influence future wages. The
theory predicts that it will be easier for truly aligned types to
signal their shared values and be distinguishable from others,
the lower the proportion of aligned types in the population.
We observe relatively low proportions of between just one
tenth and a quarter of employees with strongly shared values
in our sample, depending on employment sector, which
suggests that so-called ‘signal-jamming’ by unaligned types
should not be a significant problem. Nevertheless it would
be interesting to investigate the signalling of values further
in future work.
Given our evidence that shared values are associated
with higher employee effort, an obvious question from
an employer perspective is whether, and the extent to
which, employee values can be cultivated to bring them
into line with organisational objectives. Akerlof (1983,
p. 55) suggests exactly this when referring to ‘loyalty
filters,’ stating that an agent’s loyalty “may not only be
chosen by himself [...] but instead by another agent acting
in his own selfish interest, such as [...] an employer
interested in extracting unselfish performances from his
employees.” Indeed, in subsequent work the observation is
made that management policy strives to affect the alignment
of employer and employee values: “Current theories of
management emphasize management’s role in changing
employee objectives [...]. Aligning the objectives of workers
and management is the goal in Management by Objective,
where employees are given a role in setting their own goals”
(Akerlof and Kranton 2005, p. 20). While this may of course
still be possible, we do not find any evidence for it in
our sample of employers and employees; our measures for
shared values and employee tenure are not significantly
correlated. However the proportion of employees with
strongly shared values does increase with age. It would
thus appear that there is greater selection of individuals
into jobs with employers with whom they share values,
and better employer-employee matching at later stages of
an individual’s whole career, while there is less direct
influencing by employers of their incumbent employees’
values. In order to test for this satisfactorily we would need
panel data at the individual level to follow the same workers
and the development of their values over time.13
A further limitation of relying on cross-sectional data on
employees is that we cannot directly account for the effects
of unobserved events in their careers. To the extent that these
are randomly distributed they would not bias our results.
However, one example that is worth considering is the effect
of maternity leave on the career profiles of women both
in having an effect on the length of their tenure and as
a signal to employers of family intentions. Buligescu et al.
(2009) find a significant wage penalty for women following
maternity leave using German data, but the effect diminishes
within two to three years. Manchester et al. (2008) offer
some evidence that wage penalties are due to employers
interpreting maternity leave as a signal of lower commitment
rather than due to reductions in effort. As such this may
suggest that spells of maternity leave could interfere with
the shared values signal but that the effect is likely to be
relatively short-lived within an employment spell.
We have chosen to derive our hypotheses from a
theoretical model (Shchetinin 2012) according to which the
sharing of values compensates employees for their career and
monetary wage progression. In this model career concerns
are nevertheless still present for employeeswho share values.
Yet it is plausible that employees who share values with their
employers are simply less interested in monetary gain, not
considering the negative impact of higher wages on their
employer and instead sharing joint concerns with them about
issues such as the environment or politics.14 This would lead
to similar hypotheses about shared values and effort without
relying on the career concerns mechanism.
Overall, we have found evidence of different tenure-effort
profiles for employees who agree strongly that they share
many of the values of their employing organisations, and
those who do not. Further work could exploit the panel
structure of theWERS data, where a subsample of employers
was interviewed in both 2004 and 2011. This could allow
us to control for organisational fixed effects, and to explore
how the impact of sharing values changed before and after
the global financial crisis, albeit with a smaller sample of
employers and employees.
6 Conclusion
We have argued that the alignment of values between
employers and employees can have a significant effect on
employee effort and so on the patterns of hard work observed
over an employee’s tenure. Applying the theoretical model
of Shchetinin (2012) we derive four hypotheses which we
test using matched employer-employee data. We find both
a career-concerns effect and an effect of shared values
leading to increased employee overtime. By estimating
relative overtime hours we show that our results are robust
to differences in working patterns between occupations. We
also show that the tenure pattern of overtime consistent with
a career-concerns motivation is not present in employees
whose values are aligned with those of their employers.
At the descriptive level we find that twice as many
employees in the voluntary sector agree strongly that they
share the values of their organisations compared with their
counterparts in the private sector. Since our main results
also hold while controlling for the voluntary sector we
conjecture that employers there need rely less on providing
career paths than do employers in the private sector. This
is significant in helping to understand how employment
contracts, both explicit and implicit, might differ depending
on the institutional form of the employer.
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Pro-social motivation is increasingly being understood as
having an influence over many elements of the employment
relationship, both in formal terms (e.g. through wages)
and tacitly (e.g. through effort). Studying employment in
this manner allows us to explore the interaction between
pecuniary motivation and shared values in compensating
workers. Understanding the ways in which motivation can be
harnessed also has the potential to increase the efficiency of
a range of public services as nonprofit organisational forms
are increasingly involved in public-service provision.
Notes
1. The authors do not distinguish between paid and unpaid
overtime hours.
2. In this baseline model the parameter θi ∈ [0, 1] is assumed to
be common knowledge, i.e. employers are aware of the extent
to which employees share their values. Shchetinin (2012) also
analyses the case where there is information asymmetry not
just about employee talent but also about alignment with the
employer’s objectives. In such a scenario the employee has
an additional incentive to work hard in order to suggest high
alignment with the employer’s values.
3. The two-period setting is sufficient for demonstrating the
presence of career concerns and deriving our hypotheses.
Shchetinin (2012, p. 16) also considers T > 2 periods and
demonstrates how career concerns reduce effort in each
consecutive period until fading away completely in period t =
T . See Appendix 7.1 for the derivation of equation (1).
4. In fact career concerns disappear in the final period, here t = 2.
5. The extent of this “caring” is given by θi.
6. Details available on request.
7. The tenure categories are: less than 1 year, 1 to less than 2 years,
2 to less than 5 years, 5 to less than 10 years and 10 years or
more.
8. The private, public and voluntary sectors are defined according
to the formal establishment status of the employer. See Table 5
in Appendix 7.3 for details.
9. The statistics described here are listed in Table 6 in Appendix
7.4.
10. The variable gross-wage level is coded from 1 to 14 according
to the salary categories that employee respondents selected
in the WERS questionnaires. These categories were adjusted
between 2004 and 2011 to account for inflation in wages. See
Table 4 in Appendix 7.2 for details of the salary categories and
distributions by year.
11. We are grateful to the editor for a suggestion to discuss the
possible impact of differentiated tenure effects by gender,
specifically maternity leave, on our results. We discuss this in
subsection 5.3.
12. See Appendix 7.5 for the specification with binary controls for
tenure as well as a regression on a subsample of employees with
a minimum of two years’ tenure.
13. Individual employees appear only once in WERS.
14. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this alternative
explanation.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Derivation of equation (1)
This derivation is equivalent to the benchmark case presented
by Shchetinin (2012, pp. 5-6). The time structure of the two-
period model is as follows. In the first period the employer
offers a wage for work and the employee chooses a level of
effort. At the beginning of the second period the employer
offers another wage after which the employee again chooses
how much effort to exert. The employer competes with
other labour-market opportunities so the wage equals the
employee’s expected productivity. In the second period the
wage thus reflects the knowledge gained from observing the
employee’s performance in the first period.
Table 3. Order of events in the two-period model
time action
1.1 employer offers wage wi,1
1.2 employee chooses effort ei,1
2.1 employer offers wage wi,2
2.2 employee chooses effort ei,2
Equilibrium wages and effort levels are determined by
backwards induction. In the second period, the employee
chooses effort ei,2 to maximise net expected utility
max
ei,2
wi,2 + θi (E [yi,2]− wi,2)− C (ei,2)
⇔ max
ei,2
(1− θi)wi,2 + θi (a+ ei,2)− C (ei,2) .
Equilibrium effort e∗i,2 is characterised by the first-order
condition
C′
(
e∗i,2
)
= θi. (2)
In the second period the wage, which is fixed, does
not affect employee effort. However the employee will
work harder, the more important the employer’s objectives
(expected output net of wage costs) are to her (the higher
is θi). Note that if she does not share the same values as
her employer θi = 0 then the employee will not exert any
effort in the second period due to the lack of incentives.
Competition for labour in the employment market leads the
employer to offer a wage equal to expected output in the
second period, given the output observed in the first period
wi,2 = E [yi,2 | yi,1]
= E [ai + ei,2 + εi,2 | yi,1]
= E [ai | yi,1] + e
∗
i,2
= E [ai | ai + ei,1 + εi,1] + e
∗
i,2
= a+
cov (ai + ei,1 + εi,1, ai)
var (ai + ei,1 + εi,1)
·(
ai + ei,1 + εi,1 − a− e
∗
i,1
)
+ e∗i,2
= a+
σ2a
σ2a + σ
2
ε
·
(
ai + ei,1 + εi,1 − a− e
∗
i,1
)
+ e∗i,2
where e∗i,1 denotes equilibrium employee effort in the first
period. Rearranging, the wage in the second period can be
written as
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wi,2 =
σ2ε
σ2a + σ
2
ε
· a+
σ2a
σ2a + σ
2
ε
·(
ai + ei,1 + εi,1 − e
∗
i,1
)
+ e∗i,2. (3)
It follows that the employee can increase her second-
period wage by exerting a higher level of effort in the first
period ∂wi,2/∂ei,1 > 0. Only total output is observable, not
individual inputs (ability, effort and noise), so she can signal
high innate ability to the employer by working harder in the
first period. She will choose a level of effort to maximise
the present value of her net expected utility across both time
periods:
max
ei,1
E [Ui,1 − C (ei,1)] + δ · E [Ui,2 − C (ei,2)]
⇔ max
ei,1
wi,1 − C (ei,1) + θi (yi,1 − wi,1) +
δ ·E [wi,2 − C (ei,2) + θi (yi,2 − wi,2) | ei,1]
⇔ max
ei,1
(1− θi)wi,1 − C (ei,1) + θi (ai + ei,1 + εi,1)
+ δ · (1− θi)
(
σ2ε
σ2a + σ
2
ε
· a+
σ2a
σ2a + σ
2
ε
·(
ai + ei,1 + εi,1 − e
∗
i,1
)
+ e∗i,2
)
+
δ · θi
(
a+ e∗i,2
)
− δ · C (ei,2) .
This optimisation problem reduces to
max
ei,1
− C (ei,1) + θi · ei,1 + δ (1− θi) ·
σ2a
σ2a + σ
2
ε
· ei,1
with equilibrium effort e∗i,1 characterised by the first-order
condition
C′
(
e∗i,1
)
= θi + (1− θi) · δ ·
σ2a
σ2a + σ
2
ε
. (4)
Equation (1) is simply the combination of equations (2)
and (4) for t ∈ {1, 2}.
7.2 Salary data
Table 4. Distribution of salaries in the sample
Sector
Annual salary private public voluntary
2004 (£)
0− 2, 600 280 189 37
2, 601− 4, 160 385 171 55
4, 161− 5, 720 513 198 56
5, 721− 7, 280 491 301 77
7, 281− 9, 360 664 331 90
9, 361− 11, 440 981 421 96
11, 441− 13, 520 1, 160 575 86
13, 521− 16, 120 1, 478 727 95
16, 121− 18, 720 1, 247 585 81
18, 721− 22, 360 1, 437 770 72
22, 361− 28, 080 1, 386 845 74
28, 081− 35, 360 1, 099 707 72
35, 361− 45, 240 660 327 35
45, 241− 746 185 14
2011 (£)
0− 3, 120 230 180 36
3, 121− 5, 200 345 135 65
5, 201− 6, 760 315 157 71
6, 761− 8, 840 359 285 112
8, 841− 11, 440 620 488 128
11, 441− 13, 520 737 454 116
13, 521− 16, 120 811 653 149
16, 121− 19, 240 970 860 171
19, 241− 22, 360 934 760 180
22, 361− 27, 040 1, 084 792 195
27, 041− 33, 800 1, 048 853 190
33, 801− 42, 640 813 710 166
42, 641− 54, 600 553 301 95
54, 601− 591 188 61
Source: UK Workplace Employment Relations Survey
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7.3 Sector data
Table 5. Defining the private, public and voluntary sectors
Formal status of establishment Frequency in the sample
Private sector
Public Limited Company (PLC) 7, 505
Private limited company 10, 907
Company limited by guarantee 1, 044
Partnership (including Limited Liability
Partnership) / Self-proprietorship 1, 567
Body established by Royal Charter 469
Co-operative / Mutual / Friendly society 445
Public sector
Government-owned limited company / Nationalised
industry / Trading Public Corporation 1, 132
Public service agency / 1, 271
Other non-trading public corporation 258
Quasi Autonomous National Government Organisation 146
Local/Central Government (including NHS and
Local Education Authorities) 10, 341
Voluntary sector
Trust / Charity 2, 675
Total employees 37, 760
Source: UK Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004, 2011
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7.4 Descriptive statistics (extension to Table 1)
Table 6. Descriptive statistics (extension to Table 1)
Sector
Variable private public voluntary
overtime hours > 0 0.499 (0.500) 0.475 (0.499) 0.497 (0.500)
overtime hours 3.644 (5.878) 3.365 (5.959) 3.347 (5.387)
part-time work 0.207 (0.405) 0.312 (0.463) 0.357 (0.479)
tenure (years) 5.784 (4.277) 6.697 (4.307) 5.707 (4.189)
strongly shared values 0.123 (0.328) 0.146 (0.353) 0.229 (0.420)
gross-wage level 8.525 (3.329) 8.505 (3.154) 7.889 (3.381)
trade-union member 0.228 (0.420) 0.628 (0.483) 0.282 (0.450)
supervisor 0.342 (0.474) 0.341 (0.474) 0.370 (0.483)
male 0.537 (0.499) 0.345 (0.475) 0.296 (0.456)
aged 16− 21 0.068 (0.251) 0.015 (0.120) 0.035 (0.183)
aged 22− 29 0.179 (0.384) 0.116 (0.320) 0.142 (0.349)
aged 30− 39 0.250 (0.433) 0.227 (0.419) 0.212 (0.409)
aged 40− 49 0.252 (0.431) 0.323 (0.468) 0.267 (0.442)
aged 50− 59 0.197 (0.398) 0.264 (0.441) 0.258 (0.437)
aged 60+ 0.054 (0.226) 0.055 (0.228) 0.088 (0.283)
married or cohabiting 0.669 (0.471) 0.728 (0.445) 0.674 (0.469)
single 0.246 (0.431) 0.164 (0.371) 0.207 (0.406)
widowed 0.011 (0.104) 0.015 (0.123) 0.019 (0.138)
separated 0.075 (0.263) 0.093 (0.290) 0.099 (0.299)
dependent children 0.369 (0.483) 0.429 (0.495) 0.354 (0.478)
year = 2011 0.429 (0.495) 0.518 (0.500) 0.649 (0.477)
observations 21, 937 13, 148 2, 675
Source: UK Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004, 2011
Note: Sample standard deviations in parentheses.
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7.5 Alternative model specifications
Table 7. Tobit regression with binary controls for tenure
6
tenure ∈ [1, 2) 0.094∗∗ (0.091)
tenure ∈ [2, 5) −0.042∗∗ (0.078)
tenure ∈ [5, 10) −0.266∗∗ (0.084)
tenure ≥ 10 −0.441∗∗ (0.085)
strongly shared values (ssv) 0.205∗∗ (0.149)
ssv · tenure ∈ [1, 2) −0.016∗∗ (0.220)
ssv · tenure ∈ [2, 5) 0.156∗∗ (0.181)
ssv · tenure ∈ [5, 10) 0.150∗∗ (0.188)
ssv · tenure ≥ 10 0.389∗∗ (0.178)
wage level 0.348∗∗ (0.010)
part-time (≤ 30 hours/week) 0.312∗∗ (0.077)
year = 2011 −0.045∗∗ (0.058)
Constant −6.137∗∗ (0.138)
Pseudo R2 0.033
Observations 37, 760
Left-censored observations 19, 248
Employer clusters 3, 618
Notes:
(1) Dependent variable: ln
(
employee overtime hours
mean overtime hours for occupation and year
)
.
(2) Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering by
employer.
(3) Additional controls: sector, trade-union membership,
foremanship, gender, age group, marital status, dependent
children.
Reference group: working in private sector, female, aged
40− 49, married/cohabiting, no dependent children.
(4) ∗∗ (∗) denotes statistically significant difference from zero
at the 1% (5%) level.
Table 8. Tobit regression, employees with minimum tenure of 2
years
7
tenure −0.047∗∗ (0.008)
strongly shared values 0.224∗∗ (0.145)
strongly shared values · tenure 0.027∗∗ (0.017)
wage level 0.355∗∗ (0.012)
part-time (≤ 30 hours/week) 0.170∗∗ (0.084)
year = 2011 −0.077∗∗ (0.064)
Additional controls yes
Constant −6.004∗∗ (0.152)
Pseudo R2 0.035
Observations 28, 388
Left-censored observations 14, 404
Employer clusters 3, 509
Notes:
(1) Dependent variable: ln
(
employee overtime hours
mean overtime hours for occupation and year
)
.
(2) Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering by
employer.
(3) Additional controls: sector, trade-union membership,
foremanship, gender, age group, marital status, dependent
children.
Reference group: working in private sector, female, aged
40− 49, married/cohabiting, no dependent children.
(4) ∗∗ (∗) denotes statistically significant difference from zero
at the 1% (5%) level.
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